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Abstract 
In  this  research,  a  hierarchical  off-line  anomaly  network  intrusion  detection 
system based on Distributed Time-Delay Artificial Neural Network is introduced. 
This research aims to solve a hierarchical multi class problem in which the type of 
attack (DoS, U2R, R2L and Probe attack) detected by dynamic neural network. 
The results indicate that dynamic neural nets (Distributed Time-Delay Artificial 
Neural Network) can achieve a high detection rate, where the overall accuracy 
classification rate average is equal to 97.24%. 
Keywords: Anomaly, Intrusion detection system, Artificial neural network,  
                  Distributed time-delay artificial neural network. 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
A single intrusion of a computer network can result in the loss or unauthorized 
utilization or modification of large amounts of data and causes users to question 
the  reliability  of  all  of  the  information  on  the  network.  There  are  numerous 
methods of responding to a network intrusion, but they all require the accurate 
and timely identification of the attack [1, 2]. 
Security  policies  or  firewalls  have  difficulty  in  preventing  such  attacks 
because of the hidden weaknesses and bugs contained in software applications. 
Moreover, hackers constantly invent new attacks and disseminate them over the 
internet.  Disgruntled  employees,  bribery  and  coercion  also  make  networks 
vulnerable to attacks from the inside. Mere dependence on the stringent rules set 
by security personnel is not sufficient. Intrusion detection systems (IDS), which 
can detect, identify and respond to unauthorized or abnormal activities, have the 
potential to mitigate or prevent such attacks [3].  458       L. M. Ibrahim                          
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Abbreviations 
 
ANN  Artificial neural network 
DTDNN  Distributed time-delay neural network 
GA   Genetic algorithm 
IDS  Intrusion detection system 
Intrusion  detection  systems  (IDS)  have  emerged  to  detect  actions  which 
endanger the integrity, confidentiality or availability of a resource as an effort to 
provide a solution to existing security issues. This technology is relatively new, 
however, since its beginnings, an enormous number of proposals have been put 
forward  to  sort  this  situation  out  in  the  most  efficient  and  cost  effective  of 
manners [4]. 
There  are  two  general  categories  of  attacks  which  intrusion  detection 
technologies attempt to identify - anomaly detection and misuse detection, refer to 
Fig. 1. Anomaly detection identifies activities that vary from established patterns 
for users, or groups of users. Anomaly detection typically involves the creation of 
knowledge bases that contain the profiles of the monitored activities. The second 
general  approach  to  intrusion  detection  is  misuse  detection.  This  approach 
involves  the  comparison  of  a  user’s  activities  with  the  known  behaviors  of 
attackers  attempting  to  penetrate  a  system.  While  anomaly  detection  typically 
utilizes threshold monitoring to indicate when a certain established metric has 
been reached, misuse detection approach frequently utilize a rule-based approach. 
When  applied  to  misuse  detection,  the  rules  become  scenarios  for  network 
attacks. The intrusion detection mechanism identifies a potential attack if a user’s 
activities  are  found  to  be  consistent  with  the  established  rules.  The  use  of 
comprehensive rules is critical in the application of expert systems for intrusion 
detection [1]. 
 A  number  of  approaches  based  on  computing  have  been  proposed  for 
detecting  network  intrusions.  The  guiding  principle  of  soft  computing  is 
exploiting the tolerance of imprecision, uncertainty, partial robustness and low 
solution cost. Soft computing includes many theories such as Fuzzy Logic (FL), 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs), Probabilistic Reasoning (PR), and Genetic 
Algorithms (GAs). When used for intrusion detection, soft computing is a general 
term  for  describing  a  set  of  optimization  and  processing  techniques  that  are 
tolerant  of  imprecision  and  uncertainty.  Soft  computing  is  often  used  in 
conjunction with rule-based expert systems where the knowledge is usually in the 
form of if-then rules. Despite different soft computing based approaches having 
been  proposed  in  recent  years,  the  possibilities  of  using  the  techniques  for 
intrusion detection are still underutilized [5-7]. 
Some early research on IDSs explored neural networks for intrusion detection. 
These  can  be  used  only  after  training  on  normal  or  attack  behaviours,  or 
combination  of  the  two.  Most  supervised  neural  net  architectures  require 
retraining to improve analysis on varying input data, unsupervised nets, which 
offer greater adaptability, can improve their analysis capability dynamically [8]. 
The majority of currently existing IDS face a number of challenges such as 
low detection rates and high false alarm rates, which falsely classifies a normal Anomaly Network Intrusion Detection System Based on DTDNN     459 
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connection  as  an  attack  and  therefore  obstructs  legitimate  user  access  to  the 
network resources. These problems are due to the sophistication of the attacks and 
their intended similarities to normal behavior. More intelligence is brought into 
IDS by means of Machine Learning (ML). Theoretically, it is possible for a ML 
algorithm to achieve the best performance, i.e. it can minimize the false alarm rate 
and maximize the detection accuracy. However, this normally requires infinite 
training sample sizes (theoretically). In practice, this condition is impossible due 
to limited computational power and real-time response requirement of IDS. IDS 
must be active at any time and they cannot allow much delay because this would 
cause a bottleneck to the whole network [9]. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The Flow Chart of Misuse Detection                                                    
and Anomaly Detection Application [10]. 
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To overcome low detection rate and high false alarm problems in currently 
existing  IDS,  we  propose  a  hierarchical  off  line  Anomaly  intrusion  detection 
system using Distributed Time-Delay Artificial Neural Network to enhance the 
performance of intrusion detection for rare and complicated attacks.  In this paper, 
we introduce anomaly intrusion detection system, this can detect network-based 
attacks  using  dynamic  neural  nets,  and  has  facilities  for  training,  testing,  and 
tuning of dynamic nets for intrusion detection purpose.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows; Section 2 presents related 
works  of  intrusion  detection  systems  with  ANN.  Section  3  introduces  our 
proposal system. Section 4 shows the experiments and results and in Section 5 are 
the conclusions and future works. 
 
2.   Related Work with Artificial Neural Network  
The goal for using ANNs for intrusion detection is to be able to generalize from 
incomplete data and to be able to classify data as being normal or intrusive. An 
ANN consists of a collection of processing elements that are highly interconnected. 
Given a set of inputs and a set of desired outputs, the transformation from input to 
output is determined by the weights associated with the interconnections among 
processing elements. By modifying these interconnections, the network is able to 
adapt  to  desired  outputs.  The  ability  of  high  tolerance  for  learning-by-example 
makes neural networks flexible and powerful in IDS [11]. 
Neural networks can easily represent non-linear relationships between input 
data and output data. Even if the data is incomplete, neural networks are able to 
correctly classify the different data classes captured from the network or other 
sources. An increasing number of researches have been conducted on intrusion 
detection based on neural networks. Neural-net-based IDSs can be classified into 
the following four categories [8], the first category MLFF neural-net-based IDSs 
includes  the  systems  built  on  Multi-Layer  Feed-Forward  (MLFF)  neural  nets, 
such as the Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) and Back Propagation (BP). MLFF 
neural nets have been used in most early research in neural-net-based IDSs.  
Works including [1, 3, 12, 13] used MLFF neural nets for anomaly detection 
based on user behaviours. Other researchers like [4, 6, 13, 14] have been used 
MLP to detect Anomaly IDSs and study the effective of using MLP in detecting 
anomaly IDSs. 
InSeonin [15] in 2002 tried to integrate a smart detection engine into a firewall 
and  detecting  unusual  structures  in  data  packets  uses  a  classical  feed-forward 
multi-layer  perceptron  network:  a  back  propagation  neural  network  and  time 
delay  neural  network  to  program-based  anomaly  detection.  Also  Byoung-Doo 
[16] in 2006 built IDS deals well various mutated attacks, as well as well-known 
attacks by using Time Delay Neural Network classifier that discriminates between 
normal and abnormal packet flows. 
Other researchers have compared the effectiveness of MLFF neural nets to 
other neural nets, Siddiqui [17] in 2004 compared the effective of BP with Fuzzy 
ARTMAP, Grediaga [18] in 2006 compared the effective of MLFF with Self 
organization map (SOM), Zhang [19] in 2004 make comparison between BPL 
and  RBF  network  in  IDSs,  and  Vaitsekho  [20]  in  2009  compared  effectives Anomaly Network Intrusion Detection System Based on DTDNN     461 
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between MLFF and recurrent neural network. MLFF neural nets have been shown 
to have lower detection performance than SOM. 
The  second  category  is  recurrent  and  adaptive  neural-net-based  IDSs,  this 
category includes  systems  built on  recurrent  and adaptive neural nets such as 
ELMAN and CMAC. By getting feedback from its output or its protected system, 
the neural net preserves the correlation of current system inputs with previous 
system inputs and states. Debar et al. [21] in 1999 used a simplified ELMAN 
recurrent  net  (GENT)  and  multi-layer  recurrent  net  with  back-propagation  to 
predict the next acceptable command. Cannady in 2000 has applied the CMAC 
(Cerebellar Model Articulation Controller) net – a form of adaptive neural nets – 
to learn new attacks autonomously by modified reinforcement learning [22]. 
The  third  category;  unsupervised  neural-net-based  IDSs  uses  unsupervised 
learning neural nets to classify and visualize system input data to separate normal 
behaviours from abnormal or intrusive ones. Most of the systems in this category 
use Self-Organizing Maps (SOMs), while a few use other types of unsupervised 
neural nets. Fox was the first to apply an SOM to learn the characteristics of 
normal system activity and identify statistical variations from the normal trends 
[23].  Rhodes  et  al.  [24],  Höglund  et  al.  [25],  Lichodzijewski  et  al.  [26]  and 
Ramadas [27] trained SOM on a collection of normal data from UNIX audit data 
and used it for detecting anomalous user activity. 
Hybrid  neural-net-based  IDSs  is  last  category  of  neural-net-based  IDSs 
encompasses  systems  that  combine  supervised  and  unsupervised  neural  nets. 
Jirapummin [28] proposed employing hybrid neural network for both visualizing 
intrusions  using  Kohenen’s  SOM  and  classifying  intrusions  using  a  Resilient 
Propagation neural network (RPROP). Horeis [29] used a combination of SOM and 
Radial Basis Function (RBF) nets. The system offers generally better results than 
IDSs based on RBF nets alone. Integration and combination of neural-net-based 
IDSs (as an intelligent component in detecting variations of known and especially 
unknown attacks), with other preventive techniques such as firewalls and access 
control is a new research area. A sample of this research has been introduced by 
InSeon and Ulrich [6]. The main purpose of their research was integrating a smart 
detection engine (based on neural nets) into a firewall. The presented system not 
only detects anomalous network traffic as in classical IDSs, but also detects unusual 
structures in data packets that suggest the presence of virus data [8]. 
The idea of designing a flexible IDS system was conceived for applying more 
complicated  types  of  supervised  neural  nets  which  probably  have  higher 
capability in intrusion detection and to solve a hierarchical multi class problem in 
which the type of attack (DoS, U2R, R2L and Probe attack) detected by dynamic 
neural network.  
This system was constructed to provide the facilities for tuning, testing, and 
applying dynamic Distributed Time-Delay neural nets in intrusion detection. The 
system was used to detect the malicious attacks in the network. 
 
 
3.   Proposed Intrusion Detection System 
The  proposed  intrusion  detection  system,  as  shown  in  Fig.  2,  consists  of  the 
following modules 462       L. M. Ibrahim                          
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                                                                                                 Action/Report                                                                                        
Fig. 2. Structure Intrusion Detection System. 
 
3.1. Data pre-processor module 
The first module of proposed IDS is data pre- processor that means collects and 
formats the data to be analyzed by the detection algorithm. In proposed IDSs, 
KDD99 is used as database to train and test the system performance; the KDD99 
data is original from 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation. Under the 
sponsorship of Defense Advanced Research project s Agency (DARPA) and Air 
Force  Research  Laboratory  (AFRL),  MIT  Lincoln  Labs  has  collected  and 
distributed the datasets for the evaluation of computer network intrusion detection 
system. [7, 10, 13, 30, 31]. 
The  first  step of  preprocessing is to  select  features from KDD99 dataset,  the 
features of the dataset have been seen below and divided into three sets as in [6, 14], 
these sets are: Features describing the commands used in the connection (instead of 
Data pre-processing   module  
Pre-processed the selected data to be suitable and used as input data in detection 
module, for example: 5, 23, 3, 33, 35, 34, 24, 36, 2, 39, 4,... etc  
 
Detection module 
Distributed  Time-Delay  Artificial  Neural  Network  used  as  detection  module  to 
detect intruders and classify the input data to normal, denial of Service, Use to 
Root, Remote to User and probing intruders.  
Alert by email 
 
Selected 35 features from   KDD99 dataset, for example: duration, protocol_type, 
service,  flag,  src_bytes,  dst_bytes,  land,  wrong_fragment,  urgent,  hot, 
num_failed_logins, logged_in, num_compromised,... etc 
KDD99 training 
dataset (25000 
patterns for 
training  IDSs ) 
KDD99 testing 
dataset (2500 
patterns for 
testing IDSs) Anomaly Network Intrusion Detection System Based on DTDNN     463 
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the  commands  themselves),  features  describing  the  connection  specifications  and 
features describing the connection to the same host in last 2 seconds 
 35  features  are  selected  (e.g.  duration,  protocol-type,  service  …  etc,  see 
appendix (A)) from KDD99 data packets were selected as in [6] because they are 
typically present in network data packets and they provide a complete description 
of the information transmitted by the packet. The second step of preprocessing is 
to convert the 35 features into standardized numeric representation, (Table 1). A 
36’Th element was assigned to each record based on a determination of whether 
this  event  represented  part  of  an  attack  on  a  network;  this  element  was  used 
during training as target output of the neural network for each record. 
 
Table 1.  35 Features Selected from KDD99 Data Packet and Target Element. 
Feature  Duration  Protocol_ 
type  Service  Flag  src_bytes 
First step of 
preprocessing 
0  tcp  http  SF  181 
Second step of 
preprocessing  0  3  19  10  181 
feature  dst_bytes  land  wrong_fragment  urgent  hot 
First step of 
preprocessing  5450  0  0  0  0 
Second step of 
preprocessing  5450  0  0  0  0 
feature  num_failed_ 
logins  logged_in  num_ 
compromised  root_shell  su_attempted 
First step of 
preprocessing  0  1  0  0  0 
Second step of 
preprocessing  0  1  0  0  0 
feature  num_root  num_file_ 
creations  num_shells  num_access 
_files 
num_outbound 
_cmds 
First step of 
preprocessing  0  0  0  0  0 
Second step of 
preprocessing  0  0  0  0  0 
feature  is_host_login  is_guest_login  count  srv_count  serror_rate 
First step of 
preprocessing  0  0  8  8  0.00 
Second step of 
preprocessing  0  0  8  8  0 
feature  srv_serror 
_rate  rerror_rate  srv_rerror 
_rate  same_srv_rate  diff_srv_rate 
First step of 
preprocessing  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00 
Second step of 
preprocessing  0  0  0  1  1 
feature  srv_diff_ 
host_rate 
dst_host_coun
t 
dst_host_srv 
_count 
dst_host_same
_ 
srv_rate 
dst_host_diff_ 
srv_rate 
First step of 
preprocessing  0.00  0.00  9  0.00  0.00 
Second step of 
preprocessing  0  0  9  0  0 
Target data  Target data  Target data  Target data 
First step of preprocessing  Normal  Second step of preprocessing  0 
 
3.2.  Detection module 
The most important component of proposed IDSs is a detection module whose 
function is to analyse and detect intrusion using artificial neural network. Neural 464       L. M. Ibrahim                          
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net used as detection module because of the utilization of a neural network in the 
detection of intrusion would be the flexibility that the network would provide. A 
neural network would be capable of analyzing the data from the network, even if 
the  data  is  incomplete  or  distorted.  Similarly,  the  network  would  possess  the 
ability to conduct an analysis with data in a non-linear fashion. Both of these 
characteristics are important in a networked environment where the information 
which is received is subject to the random failings of the system. Further, because 
some attacks may be conducted against the network in a coordinated assault by 
multiple attackers, the ability to process data from a number of sources in a non-
linear fashion is especially important. The inherent speed of neural networks is 
another benefit of this approach. Because the protection of computing resources 
requires the timely identification of attacks, the processing speed of the neural 
network  could  enable  intrusion  responses  to  be  conducted  before  irreparable 
damage occurs to the system [1]. In this paper Distributed Time-Delay Neural 
Network (DTDNN) is used as detection module in IDSs. 
 
3.2.1. Why distributed time-delay neural network (DTDNN) 
DTDNN provides a simple and efficient way of classifying data sets. To process 
data for classification we believe that DTDNN are best suited due to their high 
speed and fast conversion rates as compared with other learning techniques. Also 
DTDNN preserves topological mappings between representations, a feature which 
is desired when classifying normal v.s. intruder behavior for network data. That 
is, the relationships between senders, receivers and the protocols them, which are 
the primary features that we use, are preserved by the mapping. A DTDNN is it 
dynamic  networks  are  generally  more  powerful  than  static  networks  because 
dynamic networks have memory, they can be trained to learn sequential or time-
varying patterns. This has applications in such disparate areas as prediction in 
financial  markets,  channel  equalization  in  communication  systems,  phase 
detection in power systems, sorting, fault detection, speech recognition, and even 
the prediction of protein structure in genetics. But static (feed forward) networks 
have no feedback elements and contain no delays; the output is calculated directly 
from the input through feed forward connections. The training of static networks 
was discussed in Backpropagation. In dynamic networks, the output depends not 
only on  the current  input to the  network, but also  on  the current  or previous 
inputs, outputs, or states of the network [32]. 
 
3.2.2. Distributed time-delay artificial neural network structure 
Each layer in the Distributed Time-Delay Artificial Neural Network is made up of 
the following parts: 
• Set of weight matrices that come into that layer (which can connect from 
other layers or from external inputs), associated weight function rule used 
to  combine  the  weight  matrix  with  its  input  (normally  standard  matrix 
multiplication), and associated tapped delay line. 
• Bias vector 
• Net input function rule that is used to combine the outputs of the various 
weight  functions  with  the  bias  to  produce  the  net  input  (normally  a 
summing junction) 
• Transfer function Anomaly Network Intrusion Detection System Based on DTDNN     465 
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The network has inputs that are connected to special weights, called input 
weights, and denoted by IWi,j, where j denotes the number of the input 
vector that enters the weight, and i denotes the number of the layer to 
which  the  weight  is  connected.  The  weights  connecting  one  layer  to 
another are called layer weights and are denoted by LWi,j, where j denotes 
the number of the layer coming into the weight and i denotes the number of 
the layer at the output of the weight [32]. 
 
3.2.3. Architecture of distributed time delay artificial neural network 
A two layer Distributed Time-Delay Artificial Neural Network structure is used to 
detect  attackers  (DoS,  U2R,  R2L  and  Probe).  The  35  features  from  KDD99 
datasets are used for input data, The DTDNN transform 35-dimensional input 
data vector into 5 dimensional output vectors (0 if entrance pattern is not attack, 
and 4 values for attackers (1 for DoS, 2 for U2R, 3 for R2L, 4 for Probe). The 
DTDNN  processes  those  given  data  to  recognize  type  of  attaches  or  normal 
transactions.  Figure  3  illustrates  the  architecture  and  parameters  used  in 
simulation process, we determined the best values of important parameters for 
DTDNN by doing primary experiments were carried out and the values of Fig. 3 
were achieved. 
 
Input nodes  35  Hidden nodes  5  Output nodes  5 
Learning 
Rate  0.9  Epoch  405 iteration 
from 5000 
Performance 
mean  squared 
error 
0.001 
Momentum 
constant 
0.7  Time  0.00.4 
Transfer 
function for 
hidden layer 
Hyperbolic 
tangent sigmoid 
transfer function 
(tansig) 
Transfer 
function for 
output  layer 
Linear 
transfer 
function 
(purelin) 
Network 
training function 
Levenberg-
Marquardt 
backpropagati
on (trainlm) 
Weight/bias 
function 
Gradient descent 
with momentum 
(learngdm) 
 
Fig. 3. Distributed Time Delay Neural Network Structure. 
 (This figure represents DTDNN structure from MATLAB 7.6.0 (R2008a) neural 
network Toolbox software [32]). 
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3.3.  Alert filter 
Depending  on  the  outcome  from  the  detection  module,  is  taking  the  necessary 
precautions and to take quick decision to stop the intruder to penetrate to the computer 
network, in proposed IDSs we used email to send a warning to stop the intruder. 
 
4.   Experiment and Results 
In this section, we summarize our experimental results to detect Anomaly intrusion 
detections using Distributed Time-Delay Artificial Neural Network over KDD99 
dataset.  The  full  training  set  of  the  KDD99  dataset  has  4,898,431  connections 
covering normal network traffic and four categories of attacks [6, 13, 27, 33]:  
• Denial of Service (DoS): A DoS attacks is a type of attack in which the 
hacker makes memory resources too busy to serve legitimate networking 
requests and hence denying users access to a machine. 
• User to Root Attacks (U2R): Unauthorized access to local root privileges.  
• Remote to User attack (R2L): An attacker sends packets to a machine 
over a network, then exploits machine’s vulnerability to illegally gain local 
access as a user. 
• Probing: Attacker tries to gain information about the target host. 
 
For  our  experiments,  the  training  dataset  consist  of  25000  patterns  (5000 
patterns for each class of DoS, R2L, U2R, Probe, Normal), and testing dataset 
consist of 2500 patterns (500 patterns for each class). We are only interested in 
knowing to which category (Normal, DoS, R2l, U2R, Probe) a given connection 
belonged. The accuracy of each experiment is based on percentage of successful 
classification (PSC) on train and test dataset, where 
PSC= (number of correctly classified instance / number of instance in the test dataset) 
The DTDNN network was trained until the desired mean square error of 0.001 
was  met,  during  the  training  process  the  goal  was  met  at  405  epochs  for 
Distributed Time-Delay. Table 2 show the performance of the neural network 
training algorithm, the bottom row shows that overall accuracy classification is 
99.884% for Distributed Time-Delay. 
Table 2. Training Performance for Distributed Time-Delay ANN. 
Class name 
Distributed Time-Delay 
Number of 
test patterns 
for each 
Class 
Number of 
correctly 
classified 
patterns 
percentage of 
successful 
classification 
(PSC) 
Normal  5000  5000  100% 
DoS  5000  4990  99.8% 
R2l   5000  4993  99.86% 
U2R   5000  4999  99.98% 
Probe  5000  4989  99.78% 
Overall Accuracy Classification Rate Average = ( 
PSC(normal)+ PSC(DoS) + PSC(R2L)+ PSC(U2R)+ PSC(Probe) ) / 5 )  99.884% Anomaly Network Intrusion Detection System Based on DTDNN     467 
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Table 3 shows that by using DTDNN, the last column indicate that the PSC 
is 98.4% of the actual ‘Normal’ data points were detected correctly. In the same 
way PSC for ‘DoS’ 97.6% , ‘Probe ’ 98.2% ,  ‘R2l’ 95.8% and  ‘U2R’ 96.2% of 
actual ‘attack’ test were correctly detected. The bottom row shows that the Overall 
classification rate average was 97.24%. Its detection rates (PSC) on deferent attack 
categories are displayed in Fig. 4. We could discover a general trend of increasing 
performance as more intrusions are added into training set.  
Several recently published resulted and our results on the same dataset are 
listed in Table 4. We can find that our IDSs are greatly competitive with other and 
Fig. 5 indicates that our system has possibilities for detection and classification 
computer  attacks.  Distributed  Time-Delay  Artificial  Neural  Network  is 
implemented using MATLAB 7.6.0 (R2008a) neural network Toolbox software. 
 
Table 3. Performance of the Distributed Time-Delay ANN. 
Class name 
Number of 
test patterns 
for each 
Class 
Number of 
correctly 
classified 
patterns 
percentage of 
successful 
classification 
(PSC) 
Normal  500  492  98.4% 
DoS  500  488  97.6% 
R2l   500  479  95.8% 
U2R   500  481  96.2% 
Probe  500  491  98.2% 
Overall Classification Rate Average = ( PSC(normal)+ 
PSC(DoS) + PSC(R2L)+ PSC(U2R)+ PSC(Probe) ) / 5 )  97.24% 
 
 
 
     
 
Fig. 4. Detection Rate on Dataset for Anomaly Detection System. 
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Table 4 . Compression for Intrusion Detection Systems Using ANN. 
Research 
ANN type  Database 
 
percentage of successful 
classification (PSC) for 
test dataset 
[1] Cannady, 1998  MLFF  RealSecure™ 
network 
monitor 
91% 
[27] Ramadas M., 
2003 
(SOM  DARPA 
 
95.42% 
[14] Moradi M., 
2004 
2 hidden layers 
MLP 
DARPA  91% 
[17] Siddiqui M., 
2004 
backpropagation 
and fuzzy 
ARTMAP 
DARPA  81.37% for BP and 80.52% 
for fuzzy ARTMAP (overall 
PSC = 80.945) 
[34] Mukkamalaa 
S., 2005 
 
Backpropagation  DARPA  97.04% 
[18] Grediaga, A , 
2006 
(MLP and a SOM  DARPA 
 
For MLP is 94.2997% and 
for SOM is  99.01% 
[6] Sammany M., 
2007 
2 hidden layers 
MLP 
DARPA 
 
93.43% (overall PSC = 
96.65) 
[20]Vaitsekhovich 
L.,2009 
RNN and MLP.  KDD-99  Detection for DoS (94.20%) 
, U2R  (86.54%) ,R2L 
(85.59%) , Probe (97.78%), 
Normal  (85.22%) (overall 
PSC = 89.886) 
Proposed IDSs  DTDNN  KDD-99  Detection for DoS (97.6 %), 
U2R  (96.2%) , R2L 
(95.8%)  Probe (98.2%), 
Normal  (98.4%) (overall 
PSC = 97.24) 
 
 
Fig. 5. Detection Rate on Dataset for IDSs.  
 
5.   Conclusions 
In  this  paper,  we  presented  a  practical  solution  to  using  dynamic  supervised 
artificial neural network in hierarchical anomaly intrusion detection system. The 
system  is  able  to  employ  dynamic  supervised  neural  nets  for  classifying  and 
separating normal traffic from the attack traffic (DoS, R2L, U2R, Probe). 
The proposed system was used to tuning, training, and testing Distributed Time 
Delay neural network in intrusion detection. Evaluation of the DTDNN efficiency in Anomaly Network Intrusion Detection System Based on DTDNN     469 
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anomaly intrusion detection was performed detection performance, the result show 
that DTDNN in 97.24% were able to recognized attack traffic (PSC for DoS (97.6 %), 
U2R (96.2%), R2L (95.8%)  Probe (98.2%) from normal one (Normal (98.4%)).  
Experiments on the KDD99 network intrusion dataset show that DTDNN are 
best suited due to their high speed and fast conversion rates as compared with other 
learning techniques and a DTDNN are more powerful than static networks because 
dynamic networks have memory, they can be trained to learn sequential or time-
varying  patterns,  and  also  show  that  our  approach  by  using  DTDNN  obtains 
superior performance in comparison with other state-of-the-art detection methods. 
In the future, we will hope to detected attackers in each class of (DoS, R2L, 
U2R,  Probing)  combine  Artificial  neural  network  methods  and  fuzzy logic  to 
improve the accuracy of IDS. 
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